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AGENCY
Staffing Service Nurse Acts as Hospital's Borrowed Servant
The Court of Appeals of Georgia held a nurse, who gave medication
leading to the death of patient, was a borrowed servant of defendant
hospital.! Therefore, the staffing service that provided the nurse was
granted summary judgment. 2
A patient vent to defendant hospital complaining of a swollen tongue
and difficulty swallowing.3 The patient was initially assessed and treated

by emergency room personnel.4 A physician covering for patient's regular
physician vent to defendant hospital to assess his condition.5 The
physician determined patient had experienced an allergic reaction to his
blood pressure medication.6 Therefore, the patient was kept in the
emergency room, and his wife was sent home to determine the names of
his blood pressure medications. 7 A few hours after the patient's wife
returned to defendant hospital with her husband's medication, an
emergency room nurse gave patient a dose of the blood pressure
medication that the treating physician suspected was the cause of his
allergic reaction.8 The nurse claimed he administered the medication
pursuant to an order made by patient's treating physician. 9
Approximately six hours later, patient was examined by his regular
physician who concluded patient's symptoms were consistent with an
allergic reaction to his blood pressure medication.'
At that time,
patient's wife informed his regular physician that her husband had
received another dose of the blood pressure medication after being
admitted to the emergency room." Patient's regular physician responded
that patient would be fine; subsequently, patient was discharged with
directions to see his regular physician the following morning." Patient

'Brown v. Starmed Staffing, L.P., 490 S.E.2d 503, 509 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
2

Id. at*1.
id. at *1.

3

51d.
6

Brown, 490 S.E. 2d at 505.

7Id..

'Id.
9Id.

'OId. at 505-06.
"Brown,
490 S.E.2d at 506.*1.
2
' Id.
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the next morning, and choked to death
suffered another allergic reaction
3
on his grossly swollen tongue.1
Plaintiff, patient's wife, brought a medical malpractice action against
defendant hospital, physicians, and nursing staffing service.' 4 The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the nurse's staffing service,
and plaintiff appealed.' 5 Plaintiff claimed the trial court erred because the
test for establishing that the nurse was a "borrowed servant" was not
met.' 6 The appellate court found defendant hospital had complete
supervisory control of the nurse while he was caring for patient and held
the nurse was a borrowed servant of defendant hospital.17 The court
further recognized defendant hospital had the right to discharge the nurse
if his performance fell below hospital standards. 8 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the nurse staffing service's motion for summary judgment. 9
Brown v. Starmed Staffing, L.P., 490 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).

Hospital May Be Directly Liable for Patient's Injuries
Under Corporate Negligence Theory
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant hospital because plaintiff patient
had established aprimafaciecase of negligence.20
At the age of sixteen, plaintiff received prenatal care from defendant
physician, an employees of defendant hospital.2 During that time,
defendant physician had obstetrical privileges at defendant hospital,
although surgery was not within the scope of those privileges. 22 Plaintiff
alleged defendant physician negligently monitored the condition of the
fetus, resulting in injury to the child, and ultimately the child's death

3
1 1Id.

1s1d.
"Brown, 490 S.E.2d 506.

Id. at 507.
"I'd. at 506.
'9Id. at 509.
20 Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 585 (Pa. 1997).
21
1d. at 581.
"2Id.
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eleven months later.2 Plaintiff also maintained defendant hospital was
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its staff in failing to adequately
care for an infant exhibiting signs of fetal distress."4 Furthermore, plaintiff
argued defendant hospital was directly liable because the hospital acted
negligently in granting non-surgical obstetrical privileges to defendant
physician without requiring a qualified surgeon to be available if surgery
was necessary?' Plaintiff further opined defendant hospital was directly
liable for hospital's staff s failure to notify the hospital of the necessary
26
surgical delivery.
The court explained that, under a corporate negligence theory,
plaintiff must show defendant hospital had "actual or constructive
27
knowledge of the defect or procedures that created the harm."
Furthermore, defendant hospital could have been found liable if it failed
to adhere to the proper standard of care owed to patients. 23 The court
further stated corporate negligence theory is based upon the negligent acts
ofdefendant hospital; therefore, plaintiff had to rely on the negligence of
a third-party in order to establish a cause of action for direct liability.29
Additionally, plaintiff had to present expert testimony in order to prove
defendant hospital deviated from the standard of care and to establish the
0
deviation was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm3
In this case, plaintiff presented expert testimony showing that if the
nurses had notified defendant hospital of the need for a cesarean section,
the injury to the child would not have occurred." Furthermore, plaintiff
presented testimony regarding defendant hospital's failure to have an oncall surgeon in the event that emergency surgery was necessary and that
such a failure constituted a breach of the standard of care."2 In light of
that evidence, the court held plaintiff established a cause of action against
defendant hospital. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary

2'Id
'2Welsh, 698 A.2d at 584.

251d

2"Id.

27idat 584.
2Id
"Welsh, 698 A.2d at 585.
3Old.
3id. at 585.

32Id.
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judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.33 Welsh v. Bulger, 698
A.2d581 (Pa.1997).
ANTITRUST
Health Care Hospital Replacement Plan Does Not
Restrain Trade Under Sherman Act
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower
court's judgment that a health care plan's replacement of a hospital with
another hospital did not restrain trade under the Sherman Act. 34 However,
the court reversed the lower court's denial of standing, reasoning that
standing in an antitrust claim did not require a showing of competition in
the marketplace.35
Plaintiff hospital filed a claim against defendant health care plan and
replacement hospital, alleging violations of federal and state antitrust
laws.36 Specifically, plaintiff asserted defendants illegally restrained trade
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrict
competition through exclusion of plaintiff from the health care network.37
Plaintiff also asserted defendants violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act
by attempting and conspiring to monopolize the hospital services
market.38 The lower court granted summary judgment for defendants and
plaintiff appealed.39
The court began its review of the lower court's decision by
concluding plaintiff had established standing for an antitrust claim.4" The
court disagreed with the lower court's analysis of the standing issue,
stating standing in an antitrust claim did not require a showing of injury
to competition in the marketplace.41 Relying upon prior case law, the
court determined an antitrust injury must be established in order to have

3

3Welsh, 698 A. 2d at 585.

4
Doctor's Hosp. v. Southeast Medical Alliance, 123 F.3d 301, 312 (5th Cir. 1997).
3Id. at 306-07.

36

1d. at 304.

37Id.

38
1d.
39

Doctor'sHosp, 123 F.3d at 304.
40Id. at 306-07.
41id.
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standing under the Sherman Act.4 2 Furthermore, the injury should reflect
the anticompetitive effect of the violation in respect to plaintiff's position
in the marketplace. 43 Therefore, plaintiff was not required to establish
market-wide injury to competition.'
After resolving the standing issue, the court looked specifically to the
alleged Sherman Act violations. 45 The court held defendants' activities
did not constitute an injury to competition necessary to prove a violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.46 Plaintiff alleged its replacement
resulted in increased prices of hospital services, reduction in consumer
choice, and a decrease in its own competition power.47 The court
determined, however, plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of all
three contentions. 8
In regard to the Section 2 violation, the court concluded plaintiff
could not establish a monopoly claim when the market was clearly
established. 49 By reasoning that health care purchasers and consumers
could still turn to hospitals outside the defendant health care plan, the
court concluded defendants did not demonstrate an attempt and conspiracy
to monopolize; thus, Section 2 of the Sherman Act was not violated50
Doctor's Hosp. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, No. 96-30220, 1997 IWL
561939 (Sept. 25, 1997).
DISABILITY
Social Security Benefits Denied Due to
Lack of Credible Evidence
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied
claimant's motion for social security benefits due to lack of credible
evidence. 5'
42

Id. at 306 (citing Bell v. Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988)).

43Id.

4"Doctor'sHosp., 123 F.3d at 306-07.
45Id. at 307.
"Id. at 310.
47Id. at 305.
"4Id
49Doctor'sHosp., 123 F.3d at 112.
Sold.
SZJones v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 1148 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Claimant filed applications for social security disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income after injuring his back at work
while attempting to lift a large rock with a co-worker. 52 Claimant alleged
the injury caused him tremendous pain and affected his ability to work,
resulting in depression and mental impairment. 3 The Social Security
Administration (SSA) denied his application, and claimant's case
proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).54 The
AL upheld the SSA's decision, denying claimant's application for
benefits and the district court affirmed. 5
The issue before the court was whether the ALJ erred by discrediting
claimant's complaints of pain and failing to consider his psychological
impairments.56 The court acknowledged the ALJ could not dismiss
claimant's subjective complaints of pain merely because the medical
evidence was inconsistent with claimant's complaints.57 Nevertheless, the
court upheld the ALJ's decision that claimant's complaints were not
credible due to inconsistencies apparent through evidence presented by
claimant.5" The court also denied claimant's assertion relating to
psychological impairment, finding that the ALJ adequately reviewed and
considered the available evidence. 9 The court noted no evidence
demonstrated a significant level of deficiencies regarding "concentration,
persistence, or pace; or any actual episodes of deterioration or
decompensation in work settings." 6 Finally, the court held the district
court was correct in denying claimant's request for remand, because
claimant did not produce any material evidence specific to an incident
occurring after the SSA's decision. 6' Therefore, the court affirmed the
district court's ruling and denied all social security benefits to claimant.6"
Jones v. Callahan, 122 F.3d 1148 (8th Cir. 1997).

'2Id.at

1150.

"Id.
56

Jones 122F.3d at 1151.

57

Id.

581d.
59

1d. at 1153.

601Id.
6

Jones, 122 F.3d at 1154.
21d.

6
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Plaintiff Must Show Termination Was Due To
Disability To Maintain ADA Claim

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held plaintiff
employee failed to prove that he was terminated due to his disability; and,
therefore, plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).63
Plaintiff was diagnosed with Graves' disease, his supervisor at work
was informed of the diagnosis, and his co-workers observed his
deteriorating physical condition.Y After several acts of insubordination,
plaintiff was suspended and eventually fired from his position. 6 Plaintiff
filed suit against defendant employer under the ADA, alleging that he was
terminated because of his actual and/or perceived disability.' 5 The jury
returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and defendant employer appealed. 7
On appeal, the issue was whether plaintiff had succeeded in showing
that he was truly terminated due to his disability or a perceived
disability.68 In order to establish a primafacie claim under the ADA,
plaintiffhad to show defendant regarded him as having an impairment that
substantially limited a major life activity.69 This requirement
would be
70
satisfied if others treated him as having such an impairment.
After reviewing the record, the court found plaintiff failed to submit
sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant's employees, who
decided to terminate plaintiff, believed that he had a disability.7' The
court further held that even if plaintiff had succeeded in showing
defendant regarded him as disabled, plaintiff's claim would fail because
he had not presented any evidence demonstrating that his termination was
due to his disability?2 The court found the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, established only that he was terminated,

'

Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp., 126 F.3d 1088, 1094 (8th Cir 1997).

'1d. at 1090.

'Id.

at 1090.91.

"Id.at 1091.
7Id. at 1092.
6

'Roberts,126 F.3d at 1092.
'Id.

70

1d.

7Id. at 1093.
7Id. at 1094.
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because he failed to follow his supervisor's orders.7 3 Therefore, the court
ruled the lower court should have entered summary judgment in favor of
the defendant employer.74 Roberts v. Unidynamics Corp., 126 F.3d 1088
(8th Cir. 1997).
ADA Addresses Injury to Person's Rights or Reputation
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Utah held
plaintiffs claim under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) did not
survive his death, because the ADA does not address injury to the person,
but rather only injury to a person's rights or reputation. 7
Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS), brought an action against his former employer under
the ADA, the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act, and a tort claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.76 Plaintiff subsequently died.'
Defendant employer argued the discrimination claim should not survive
plaintiffs death.78 Defendant further argued plaintiffs personal
representative could not be compensated for plaintiff's claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and, therefore, filed for partial summary
judgment.79

Because the ADA does not address the issue of surviving causes of
action, 80 the court examined the state survival statute in order to determine
whether the ADA claims survived plaintiffs death.8 1 The court concluded
the survival statute allowed survival of claims for "personal injury to the
person," not an injury to a person's rights, reputation, or property. 82 The
court held discrimination under the ADA addressed injury to a person's
rights or reputation, not injury to the person, and hence, the ADA claims

73Roberts,
126 F.3d at 1094.
741d.
' 5AIlred v. Solaray, 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D. Utah 1997).
761d. at 1396.
n Id.

7'1d.
791d.
"Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1396.

"12Id.at 1398.
Id.
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did not survive plaintiffs death. 3 The court, therefore, granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff s ADA claims. 4
Allred v. Solaray,971 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Utah 1997).
Cancer Is Handicap Within the Illinois Human Rights Act
The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, upheld an Illinois Human
Rights Commission (Commission) finding, that cancer was a physical
handicap and found defendant was liable for employment discrimination
in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act).8"
Plaintiff was a health spa manager diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma, a form of cancer. 6 At trial, the parties stipulated that plaintiff
was able to perform all of her duties of employment.Y Although plaintiff
received a pay raise in September, 1987, she was terminated one month
later without justification. 8 The supervisor who ordered plaintiff's
termination claimed to have no knowledge of her cancerous condition?0'
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against her former employer."
The first issue addressed by the court was whether cancer was
considered a physical handicap within the meaning of the Act.' The court
set forth three reasons in support of characterizing cancer as a handicap."
First, the court noted cancer was not transitory or insubstantial, but rather
a serious disease that causes death.93 Second, the Act protected not only
individuals with actual handicaps, but also those with a history of
handicaps. 94 Third, if employers perceived employees as handicapped,
95
employers' actions against employees could violate the Act.

84Id.

"Lake Point Tower, Ltd. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 6S4 N.E.2d 948, 956 (11L App.
Ct. 1997).
6
/d at 950.
S71d at 95 1.

"sId

9Lake Point Tower, Ltd., 684 N.E.2d at 951.

9'Id. at 955.
92
931d. at 952-54.
Iad
"Lake Point Tower, Ltd., 684 N.E.2d at 952-54.
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The second issue was whether the defendant violated the Act in firing
the plaintiff.9 6 The court noted two significant events that occurred just
prior to plaintiffs termination: (1) a new general manager was named,
and (2) plaintiff informed defendant she would begin chemotherapy
treatments.97 The timing of these events, the court reasoned, raised an
inference of discrimination, which was not rebutted by defendant, and,
therefore, the court held the Commission was correct in finding a violation
of the Act. 98 Lake Point Tower, Ltd. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm 'n,
684 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

Employee Must Show PrimaFacieCase Under ADA
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a
lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant employer,
because plaintiff employee failed to establish discrimination based upon
disability.99 The court determined plaintiff failed to meet three of the four
elements required to establish aprimafaciecase of discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).'"0
Plaintiff was diagnosed with asymptomatic HIV in 1988," 11 and was
02
hired in 1991 as a marketing coordinator for defendant employer.
Subsequently, the plaintiff had difficulty satisfying his professional
responsibilities, which was documented in written evaluations.0 3 In 1992,
he told a senior managing officer that he was homosexual and was
infected with HIV."' 4 After the employee was transferred to the sales
department, he continued to have difficulty satisfying his professional
responsibilities and was eventually terminated.' 5 The employee filed suit,

9Sld. at 955.
97

Id.

98Id.

"Runnenbaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 123 F.3d 156, 161 (4th Cir. 1997).
'Id. at 174-175.
"'Id. at 162.
"2Id. at 161.
103Id.

°"Runnenbaum, 123 F.3d at 162.

"Id.at 163.
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claiming the termination was a result of his HIV-positive status, which
according to the employee, rendered him disabled 0 6
The issue before the court was whether plaintiff had satisfied the four
elements required to make aprinafaciecase of discrimination under the
ADA.'0 7 The court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish the first3
element requiring plaintiff to be a member of a protected class.1
Specifically, plaintiff failed to prove asymptomatic BIV infection was a
"physical or mental impairment" because the infection did not exhibit any
diminishing effects on plaintiff" 9 Additionally, plaintiff failed to prove
asymptomatic HIT substantially limited one or more of his major life
activities, including procreation or intimate sexual relations."10 Plaintiff
also failed to demonstrate the second element, that defendant employer
perceived plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially limited one
or more of his major life activities."'
The court also found that plaintiff failed to establish the third
element, requiring that he meet the legitimate expectations of his
employer,"' because his personnel record noted several instances of3
substandard performance, as well as a pattern of unprofessional conduct."
Finally, plaintiff failed to establish the fourth element, mandating that his
termination involved circumstances that raised a reasonable inference of
unlawful discrimination." 4 Because plaintiff failed to establish hisprima
facie case of discrimination, the lower court's opinion was affirmed.
Runnebaum v. Nations Bank of Maryland,123 F.3d 156 (4th Or. 1997).

Termination Claim Under ADA Not Actionable Without
Employer Knowledge of Plaintiff's Mental Disability
The Court of Appeals of California for the Second District, Division Five,
affirmed summary judgment for defendant employer in an employment
IO6I!a.
°ILd at 164.

"3Id. at 174.

"Runnenbaum, 123 F.3d at 168-169.
"OId. at 172.
..Id.at 172-174.
1d. at 175.
13Id.

"'Runnenbaum,123 F.3d at 175.
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termination case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)." 5
The court held defendant employer did not know of plaintiffs mental
disability and, therefore, was not required to reinstate her as6 a reasonable
accommodation to her mental disability under the ADA."
Plaintiff failed to return to work following the Thanksgiving
holiday," 7 and her employer sent her a letter stating that she was deemed
to have resigned her position." 8 During her absence, she had traveled to
Nevada as a result of a manic episode believed to have been triggered by
a change in her Prozac prescription. 19 Plaintiff was subsequently
admitted to a mental hospital, and her supervisor was notified of her
condition. 20 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff was informed that she had been
terminated,12' and her request for reinstatement was denied.' Plaintiff
then filed a discrimination action against her employer under the
ADA and
23
(FEHA).
Act
Housing
and
Employment
Fair
California
the
The court first analyzed plaintiffs termination under a three-step
process:
1) whether plaintiff satisfied the burden of establishing a primafacie
discrimination case,

2) whether defendant employer offered a nondiscriminatory explanation
for the termination, and

3) whether plaintiff proved defendant employer's explanation was
"pretextual."' 24
In order to establish a primafacie case, plaintiff was required to show
that:
1) she suffered from a disability,

"1 rundage v. County of L.A. Office of the Assessor, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830, 832 (Ct. App.
1997).

161d.
171d.
"aid. at 832-33.
".d, at 833.

'"Brundage, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 833.
'2id.
1221d.

"id. at 834 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Fair Employment and
Housing Act, CAL. Gov. CODE § 12940 (West 1997)).
'24Id. at 835.
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2) she was a qualified individual, and
3) she was terminated because of her disability.'2
The court held plaintiff failed to prove the third element, not proving
defendant had knowledge of her disability when she was terminated, and
thus, she could not have been terminated because of her disability." 6
The court then considered the denial of plaintiff's reinstatement
claim. 2 7 First, the court determined this claim was not a separate act
actionable under the ADA and instead should be pursued through an
administrative mandate, which was not undertaken by plaintiff.'23 Second,
reinstatement was not considered a "reasonable accommodation" under
the ADA because defendant was not required to give plaintiff a "second
chance."' 29 Additionally, plaintiff failed to identify any reasonable
accommodation that could have been provided by defendant to control her
disability. 3 Accordingly, the court aff=ied the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendant.13' Brundage v. County of Los Angeles
Office of the Assessor, 66 Cal.Rptr. 2d 830 (Ct. App. 1997).

Physician May Refuse Treatment When A Direct Threat
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted the defendant physician's motion for summary judgment in a suit
for breach of a legal duty brought by plaintiff, an HIV- positive patient,
after defendant had refused to perform an operation. 32 The court found
plaintiff had not stated a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted under both the state
statute and Title I of the Americans with
33
Disabilities Act (ADA).

t2SBrundage, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 835.
'2Id. at 836.
127Id.

128Id at 837.
'2Id. at 837-38.
'"Brundage.66 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
..Id.at 838.
"Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F. Supp 1461 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
"'Id.at 1464-65 (citing O.C.G.A § 51-1-6).
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Plaintiff contacted defendant's office in order to have a Gore-Tex
implant procedure performed.134 Upon learning of plaintiff' HIV-positive
status, defendant refused to perform the operation"' Plaintiff then filed
a complaint alleging defendant had violated Title III of the ADA, because
medical services were denied due to his disability. 36 Defendant argued
he had a right to refuse services, because performing the procedure would
have threatened his own health. 13 Although plaintiff's complaint was
premised upon violations of the ADA, he sought damages under a state
statute authorizing recovery of damages for breach of a legal duty.' In
response, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the
court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, because the state statute was
inapplicable.' Further, defendant argued plaintiff did not have standing
under the ADA because plaintiff would only be entitled to prospective
*injunctive relief, not damages. 40 In the alternative, defendant argued if
plaintiff had standing, plaintiff failed to state a violation of the ADA. 141
After examining the relevant case law and language of the Georgia
statute, the court ruled the state statute only provided recovery for a breach
42
of duty in a private action where plaintiff had no other remedy available.
Thus, plaintiff was required to bring forth a cause of action under the
ADA since that statute would provide a private cause of action and a
remedy.'43 Accordingly, the court held summary judgment in favor of the
defendant was proper.' 44
In dicta, the court concluded plaintiff did not have standing to sue
under the ADA.145 In order to have standing, plaintiff have had to show
three elements, including:
1) he suffered an injury in fact;
2) his injury was caused by defendant's conduct, and
1341d. at 1461.
1351d "

1361d.
137Jairath,972 F. Supp. at 1461, (citing O.C.G.A.
1381d
3 "
9id.
140
Id.
141Id.

142jairath,932 F. Supp. at 1461.
14id.
t

Id.
145Id

§ 51-1-5).
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3) his injury was capable of being redressed by a favorable ruling from
the court1 46

The court found plaintiff had satisfied the first two elements, but he had
not shown how his injury could have been redressed by a favorable
ruling.' 47 The court emphasized that the only remedy available under the
ADA was injunctive relief, which would not have benefited plaintiff in
this case. 148 Specifically, plaintiff had received treatment from another
physician, and stated he would never again seek treatment from defendant
again. 49 Therefore, no chance of future harm existed and injunctive relief
would not have compensated plaintiff.'

The court also analyzed plaintiffs cause of action in the event that
plaintiff had standing.15 ' In order to establish a violation of the ADA,
plaintiff must demonstrate:
1) he had a disability,

2) defendant's office was a place of public accommodation,
3) he was denied full and equal treatment because of a disability, and
4) this denial gave rise to the inference that treatment was based solely
on plaintiff's disability.'2
If plaintiff had met this burden, defendant would have to prove plaintiff
was not denied medical treatment, or the denial of such treatment was not
unlawful.'53 After a sufficient showing by defendant, the burden would
shift back to plaintiff to prove that the reasons
for refusing treatment were
54
discrimination.
the
merely a pretext for
While plaintiff in this case had established a primafacie case of
discrimination under the ADA statute, defendant successfully rebutted by
showing the denial of the Gore-Tex procedure was not unlawful due to the
"direct threat" posed to him based upon his reasonable medical

'"Id.at 1461 (citing Lujon v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992)).

"7Jairath,972 F. Supp. at 1465.
14id.
1491dL
1501dL

'Jairath, 972 F. Supp. at 1465.
3
1
5
1 4Id.

Id.
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judgment.' 55 The court held defendant should not be punished for using
caution when making medical decisions concerning a direct threat to his
health.' 56 The court concluded defendant's belief that the Gore-Tex
augmentation surgery would have posed a direct threat to his health was
reasonable and not discriminatory.' 57 Jairathv. Dyer, 972 F. Supp 1461
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
DISCOVERY
Medical Peer Review Documents Are Privileged from
unless made in Regular Course of Business
The Court of Appeals of Texas held in favor of defendant hospital,
concluding that medical peer review documents were privileged and thus,
not subject to discovery.'58
Plaintiff patient sued defendant hospital for allowing a single-use
item to be reused during his cataract surgery." 9 In his requests for
production, plaintiff asked for the following:
1) incident reports relating to his care;
2) logs of telephone calls between the defendant hospital, physicians, and
the laboratory that tested the item; and
3) correspondence between the parties named in the telephone logs. 160
Defendant hospital objected, claiming the documents were privileged from
discovery as medical peer review documents.' 61 After plaintiff filed a
motion to compel, defendant hospital submitted the documents for an in
camera review, along with an affidavit from the defendant's vice
president. The affidavit stated "the documents tendered to the Court by
counsel for [defendant] constitute[d] confidential documents,

ISSd. at 1466.
156

1d.

'"Jairath,972 F. Supp. at 1468.
158Arlington Memorial Hosp. Found. v. Barton, 952 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. App. 1997).
'id. at 928.
160id.
61

d.
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communications, and clinical testing done at the behest of the peer review
committees .... 12162
The issue presented on review was whether the documents were
privileged and, therefore, not subject to discovery.'63 The court
recognized that medical peer review documents were privileged from
discovery, unless the documents were made in the regular course of
business." 6 Except in circumstances in which disclosure was required by
law, communications to a medical peer review committee would not be
subject to subpoena or discovery without a written waiver of the privilege
of confidentiality by the committee. 65 Furthermore, the party claiming
that the documents were not subject to subpoena or discovery had the
burden of establishing that the information was privileged.L Applying
these rules, the court held that the affidavit, which alleged and proved the
privilege, along with the in camera submission, shifted the burden to
plaintiff. 67 Plaintiff then had to do one of the following:
1) controvert the affidavit,
2) show that the privilege was waived, or
3) prove that the documents were made in the ordinary course of
business.'
For the reason that plaintiff did none of the above, the court held the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering defendant to produce the
documents. 169 Arlington Mem 'l Hosp. Found.v. Barton, No. 2-97-194CV, 1997 RL 531025 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997).

1621d.
"Arlington MemorialHosp. Found., 952 S.W.2d at 929.

14Id.

"BId

'"Id
167Id.

'"Arlington MemorialHosp. Found., 952 SAV.2d at 929-30.
1Id. at 930.
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Patient Does Not Have Property Interest in Specimen Slides
The Superior Court of Connecticut held the doctrine of resjudicatawas
inapplicable and, thus, did not bar plaintiffs claim. 7 However, the court
concluded plaintiff did not have a property interest in her pap smear
specimen slides and, accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 7 '
Plaintiff filed a complaint for writ of replevin seeking to recover pap
smear specimen slides containing her tissue and genetic material that were
examined by defendant hospital's pathology lab. 7 2 Plaintiff stated she
had requested the slides and defendant failed to provide them. 7'
Defendant argued plaintiff had previously filed a complaint in an attempt
to recover the slides, and because the court denied her relief, her
subsequent claim was barred by resjudicata.'74
In the first complaint, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to argue
the issue of ownership of the slides, and the court held the claim was not
barred by resjudicata'75 In order to prevail on her subsequent complaint,
the court had to find that the plaintiff had a right of immediate
possession.1 76 The court held because plaintiff signed a consent form.
which stated: "do all things necessary preliminary to, during or after such
procedure, including the right to dispose of all tissue," plaintiff did not
have a right of immediate possession of her cells. 77 Furthermore, the
court held plaintiff did not have a possessory interest in the slides based
upon public policy limitations regarding patient's use of pathological
waste. 78 Finally, the court found plaintiff did not possess an ownership
interest in the slides because the slides were considered part of plaintiffs
medical records and thus, belonged to defendant.179 Accordingly, the

170Comelio v. Stamford Hosp., No. DV 960155779S, 1997 WL 430619, at *8 (Conn. Super
Ct. July721, 1997).
1 V'd.
1721d. at *1.
13Id.
273

1d.
6 Cornelio, 1997 WL 430619, at *2

276

17d. at *3.

'77Id.
at *7.
8

7Id.
'79Id. at *8.

1997]

CASE BRIEFS

201

court held the doctrine of resjudicatawas inapplicable to this case, but
still granted defendant's motion for summaryjudgment, finding plaintiff
did not have a possessory interest in the slides' Cornelio v. Stamford
Hosp., No. CV 960155779S, 1997 RL 430619 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21,
1997).
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
Adequacy of Notice is Question for Jury
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and
remanded a lower court's summary judgment ruling in favor of defendant
employer, which terminated plaintiff employee for giving less than thirty
days notice of a medical leave of absence."'
Plaintiff was scheduled to have breast reduction surgery on May 16,
1995282 She gave defendant three months notice of leave on February 18,
1995 for the period between May 17, and July 2, 1995.'
In April,
plaintiff learned her insurance policy would not cover breast reduction
surgery after May 1 st and, therefore, the date of her surgery was changed
to April 26."" On April 21, 1995, plaintiff requested that defendant move
the date of her leave of absence forward. 8s Defendant denied her request,
stating her position of employment could not be covered on such short
notice. 86
Plaintiff underwent bilateral reduction mnammoplasty on April 26,
and a few days later, she was fired for failing to report to work for two
consecutive days without notice.187 Plaintiff alleged her termination
violated the Family Medical Leave Act, which states that notice of leave
can be given less than thirty days in advance, but as soon as practicable,
due to lack of knowledge of when leave would be required to begin,
88
change in circumstances, or medical emergency.1
tSCornelio,1997 WL 430619, at *7.
"'Hopson v. Quitman County Hosp. & Nursing Home, 119 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 1997).
"id. at 364.
193Id.
1

4Id.

'"Id.at 365.
"'Hopson, 119 F.3d at 365.
17Id.

"'Id.at 367 (citing Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, § 2612()(2)).
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The issues presented on appeal were as follows:
1) whether change in plaintiffs surgery date due to financial
considerations constituted a "change in circumstances," allowing
plaintiff to give notice as soon as practicable;
2) whether plaintiff gave notice as soon as practicable; and
3) whether plaintiff made a reasonable effort to schedule her surgery as
to not unduly disrupt defendant's operations.89
The court held all of these issues were material questions of fact to be
decided by a jury.' 90 Therefore, the court held the lower court erred by
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant; the court remanded the
case for resolution of these factual issues. 19' Hopson v. Quitman County
Hosp. andNursing Home, 119 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 1997).

Neglect of Plaintiffs' Attorneys to Designate Expert
Witnesses Not Imputed to Plaintiff
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina vacated and remanded a lower
court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment based upon
excusable neglect. 9 2 The court held the lower court applied the wrong
legal standard by imputing inexcusable neglect of plaintiffs' attorneys to
plaintiffs without determining whether plaintiffs themselves exercised due
care regarding the handling of their case.' 93
Plaintiffs were required to designate their expert witnesses before
November 30, 1995 for their medical malpractice claim.' 94 The lower
court granted summary judgment for defendants after plaintiffs failed to
designate their witnesses by 1that
date,' 95 and plaintiffs' motion for relief
96
from judgment was denied.

'1 9Id. at 366.
'90Id. at 367.

"'Hopson, 119 F.3d at 367.
"2Briley v. Farabow, 488 S.E.2d 621, 623 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997).

193Id.

4
11
1d. at 622.
"Id. at 622-23.
96
' 1d. at 623.
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The issue before the court was whether the lower court erred by
imputing plaintiffs' attorneys' neglect to plaintiffs without determining if
plaintiffs themselves were guilty of inexcusable neglect.'9 7 The court
found plaintiffs' hiring of an out-of-state attorney to handle their claim
was not inexcusable neglect because plaintiffs also hired local counsel to
assist the out-of-state attorney. 98 The court also found the lower court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding inexcusable neglect were
inadequate because the court focused solely upon plaintiffs' attorneys'
inability to properly designate their expert witnesses.'
The court
explained plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment could have also been
denied if the plaintiffs had not presented a meritorious claim. 2
Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the case to determine if
plaintiffs had failed to present adequate and competent evidence of the
claim at the summary judgment hearing.2° ' Briley v. Farabow,488 S.E.2d
621 (NC. Ct. App. 1997).

Witness Must Be Formally Qualified as Expert Witnesses
in Order to Receive "Reasonable Fee"
The Superior Court of Connecticut held that two of the three medical
experts called by plaintiff were only fact witnesses, as opposed to expert
witnesses; and, thus, plaintiff was not entitled
to compensation from
202
defendant for the expert's "reasonable fees."
A state statute permitted a "reasonable fee" to be paid to practitioners
of the healing arts who gave expert testimony at legal proceedings.2 -3 The
court recognized the existence of this statute but stated that testimony
given by a witness formally "qualified" as an expert had to be
distinguished from testimony by a practitioner merely "disclosed" as an
expert.2( 4 The court concluded witnesses only disclosed as experts were

"7'Briley 488 S.E.2d at 623.
'"id.at 624.
'99Id.at 625.

cId.
2011d

"'Riverav. St. Francis Hosp., No. CV9205119825, 1997 WL 435868 (Conn. Supcr Ct. July
24, 1997).
2
2,3Id. at *1,citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-257(0(1997).
4Id. at * 1.
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considered fact witnesses and would not be entitled to compensation under
the statute. 205 Furthermore, the determination as to whether a witness
constituted a fact witness or an expert witness was a factual to would be
decided based upon how the witness was qualified at the proceeding.20 6
The court found defendant was required to reimburse plaintiff for one
of the three witnesses who testified on behalf of plaintiff.207 The court
determined defendant also had to reimburse plaintiff for preparation time
of that expert witness.2" The court further held defendant was required to
reimburse plaintiff for costs incurred while converting photographs into
negatives 29 as well as investigative costs up to 200 dollars.210 However,
the court rejected plaintiffs claims for reimbursement of demonstrative
charts used at trial and trial transcript expenses, holding these items did
not constitute "copies of records used in evidence." Rivera v. St. Francis
Hosp., No. CV920511982S, 1997 WT_ 435868 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 24,
1997).

Indigent Defendant Entitled to Psychiatric Expert Only
If Sanity Is a Significant Factor in Defense
The Supreme Court ofNorth Carolina upheld a lower court's decision to
deny an indigent defendant funds for retaining an independent
psychiatrist.2 ' The court reasoned that the defendant had failed to make
a threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity was likely to be a
significant part of his defense.2t 2
Defendant was on trial for first-degree murder on the basis of torture
and the felony murder rule, as well as felonious child abuse.2 1 3 Prior to
trial, he requested commitment to a psychiatric hospital in order to
determine his competency to proceed to trial.214 Defendant also filed a

20'1d.
2
06Id

207
Rivera, 1997
28

WL 435868.
' Id. at *2.
209Id. at *2, citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-257(b)(5) (1997).
210
1d. at *3, citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-257(b)(1 1) (1997).
2
1State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576, 582 (N.C. 1997).
2
12

1d.
1d. at 580.
24
M id. at 582.
213
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notice to the court that he would be raising the insanity defense and
requested a psychiatrist to assist him in preparation for trial.2"' Upon his
examination at a psychiatric hospital, defendant was diagnosed as
suffering from a polysubstance dependence and an unspecified personality
disorder.216 Based upon that diagnosis, the defendant asserted
his
217
entitlement to funds in order to hire an independent psychiatrist.
The court argued an assessment of all the facts and circumstances
known to the court must be made in determining whether defendant had
successfully made his threshold showing.2P 8 The court found defendant
failed to show that his sanity was likely to be a significant part of his
defense based upon the psychiatrist's testimony that defendant knew the
difference between right and wrong and had logical thought processes."1 9
Therefore, the court held sanity was not proven to be such a factor in his
defense at trial that fundamental fairness required the appropriation of
funds for a private psychiatrist. n° Furthermore, the lower court's refusal
to hire a private pathologist to review the state pathologist's report of the
victim's injuries was upheld on similar grounds.22' The court concluded
defendant's bare assertion that an independent expert would be beneficial
to his defense was not sufficient to justify state funding and thus, upheld
the lower court's ruling tm State v. Pierce,488 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 1997).

Expert's "More Probable than Not" Causation Testimony
Created Submissible Wrongful Death Claim
The Court of Appeals of Missouri affirmed a lower court's judgment that
expert testimony of treating physician either "more probably than not"
caused, or "did" cause, patient's death from bacterial infection was
sufficient to create submissible case of wrongful death.tm

5
21
1d.

2'Pierce,488 S.E. 2d at 582.
21
7

Id.

218Id.
219Id

2

"oId.

"2'Pierce,488 S.E. 2d at 583.
"'Id.at 584.

"'Baker v. Guzon, M.D., 950 S.W.2d 635, 648 (Mo. 1997).
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Plaintiffs, husband and children of deceased patient, brought
wrongful death action against defendant physician, alleging defendant
negligently and carelessly failed to observe, examine, diagnose, and begin
to treat patient for her symptoms until ten hours after admittance to
hospital.2 4 Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged patient died as a direct result
of that negligence. 2" The lower court entered judgment on a jury verdict
for plaintiffs and defendant physician appealed. 2 6
At trial, plaintiffs included evidence of three expert witnesses,
medical physicians, who analyzed patient's medical records, the tests
performed, and the results of the tests. 27 One physician concluded the
actions or inactions of defendant either "more probably than not" caused
or "did" cause patient's death.228 The other two witnesses testified the
actions or inactions "more probably than not" caused the patient's
death.Y9 Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending plaintiffs
failed to meet their burden of proof because the expert witnesses failed to
establish "but for" defendant's alleged negligence, patient would not have
died.20
The court refused to recognize defendant's contention despite its
recognition of the "but for" causation requirement. 1 The court examined
the three expert testimonies separately and concluded that one expert
satisfied the "but for" test by stating that the actions or inactions of
defendant "more probably than not" or "did" cause patient's death. - The
court reasoned the use of the words "more probably than not" and "did"
within the same sentence established a causal link between patient's death
and defendant's negligence. z3 In addition, by acknowledging a scientific
basis for his opinion, the expert proved that his testimony constituted
substantive causal evidence.234 Baker v. Guzon, M.D., 950 S.W.2d 635
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997).

'4Id.
at *4.
=Id.
2
mid.at *7.
2271d. at *4.

22Id.

"Baker,
1997 WL 406034.
230Id. at *5.
23
2 ZId. at *13.

Id.

23Id.

234Baker, 1997 WL 406034.
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Expert Opinions Must Be Considered by Trial Court
When Granting Summary Judgment
The Court of Appeals of Ohio for the Fourth District, Scioto County,
reversed the trial court's decision, holding genuine issues of material fact
regarding the defendant's negligence remained in dispute. 35
Plaintiff patient, who was born prematurely, had trouble breathing
after delivery;236 however, she was not intubated until after she had7
suffered oxygen deprivation to her brain, resulting in cerebral palsy.2
Plaintiff filed medical malpractice suit against defendant physician for
negligence.' 38 In response, defendant physician
filed a motion for
9
negligence.2
his
denying
summary judgment,
Plaintiff then filed an affidavit and a deposition of two experts,
contradicting defendant's statement and opining defendant had provided
substandard care.24 The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding plaintiff's experts' opinions lacked
evidentiary value.24' Plaintiff appealed.242

The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion by not
considering the opinions of the two experts provided by plaintiff.24 3 The
court stated a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether
defendant's negligence caused plaintiff's injury.244 Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial court's decision of summary judgment in favor of
defendant.245 Lawvson v. Song, No. 97 CA 2480, 1997 WL 596293 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sep. 23, 1997).

Lawson v. Song, No. 97 CA 2480, 1997 WL 596293 at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sep. 23, 1997).

26

Id. at *1.

2'71Id.
23

81d
2391d.
2

4'Lawson,

241
HL
242

1997 WVL 596293 at* 1.

1d.

2431d at *4.
2

441d.

24 5

Lawson, 1997 W'L S96293

at *4.
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EVIDENCE
DNA Evidence Admitted at Trial After
Application of Daubert Test
The Court of Appeals of Louisiana upheld the trial court's decision to
admit evidence of prior misconduct by defendant physician, as well as
DNA evidence comparing different strands of HIV-infected blood from
the defendant physician's patients.2 46 In affirming the trial court's
decision, the court applied the Daubert test in order to determine whether
the expert scientific testimony was reliable. 47
Defendant physician and plaintiff were involved in an extra-marital
affair for over a decade.248 During that time, defendant physician was
responsible for administering vitamin B-12 injections to plaintiff.249 After
ending the relationship with defendant, plaintiff alleged defendant
intentionally injected her with HIV instead of vitamin B-12 during one of
her regularly scheduled appointments.'"
First, the court addressed the issue as to whether evidence of
defendant drawing HIV-infected blood from two of his other patients
could be admitted." Under the burden of clear and convincing evidence,
the trial court concluded the evidence was admissible, because the
evidence demonstrated defendant's pattern of "taking blood and not
properly documenting it or taking blood under false pretenses." 252 The
court affimed the trial court's decision, although the court concluded the
trial court erred in applying the clear and convincing standard. 253 The
court noted the admissibility of the evidence was a preliminary finding,
which could be overruled when the court later addressed the question of
254
relevance versus prejudice under the Louisiana Rules of Evidence.
The second issue the court addressed was whether the laboratory tests
regarding DNA analysis could be admitted as evidence to determine if
2
OState
27

v. Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448, 457 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

1 1d. at 453.

24
11d. at 449.
29

1 1d. at 450.
2 0Id.
2tSchmidt, 699 So.2d at 450.
'2 id. at 451-52.
2"Id.
at 452.
4

2 Id.
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plaintiff s HIV matched the HIV of the defendant's other patients.255 The
Daubert test was utilized by the trial court to determine whether the expert
scientific evidence relating to the HIV analysis was reliable.2 6 Defendant
argued the trial court should have determined whether each step in the
methodology was properly performedZ 7 Furthermore, defendant
maintained the trial court erred in ruling that the DNA evidence was
scientifically reliable and the trial court impermissibly limited the scope
of his pretrial hearing.258 The court held the methodology used in the
laboratory experiments satisfied the Daubert test, and accepted protocols
for each methodology were used in the laboratory process.259
Furthermore, the court explained that the trier of fact, not the court, must
ultimately determine whether the protocols were properly applied and
thus, the issue was not decided during the pretrial hearing.2 9 State v.
Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448. (La. Ct. App. 1997).

Evidence of Child Abuse Victim's Repressed Memory
Recovered During Sodium Amytal
Interview Inadmissible
The Court of Appeals of California granted a lower court's petition for
extraordinary writ review holding testimony of an alleged victim of
childhood sexual abuse was inadmissible because the evidence was
recovered during a sodium amytal interview. 261 The victim was also not
allowed to testify to flashbacks before and after the sodium amytal
interview because she had no personal knowledge of these events.2z
During the alleged victim's counseling for bulimia, she began to have
flashbacks of situations with her father, which suggested possible sexual
abuse when she was between the ages of five and eight 63 She underwent
5

Id
H"

2"'Schmidt, 699 So. 2d at 453.2.
271d.
at
'81d.
29

456.

' 1d at 457.

'"Ramona v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766, 778 (Ct. App. 1997).
="Id.
2"d at 769.
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a sodium amytal interview to determine whether her flashbacks were true
memories of childhood sexual abuse. 264 Two years after the interview, the
victim had additional flashbacks of sexual abuse by her father between the
ages of twelve and sixteen. 265 The victim
subsequently filed suit against
66
her father at the age of twenty-one.
The first issue before the court was whether the victim's testimony
regarding the alleged abuse between the ages of five and eight was
admissible under the Kelly test, which requires that evidence gathered by
a new scientific technique have general acceptance in the relevant field.267
Under this test, sodium amytal interviews have been held to be unreliable
in California.2 68 The court found that any information gathered during the
sodium amytal interview should have been excluded because the
reliability of the information was not supported by the majority of
experts. 269 The testimony regarding flashbacks that occurred before the
interview was also excluded because the victim failed to show that she
knew at that time that she had been sexually abused.270
The second issue before the court was whether the evidence of
flashbacks occurring two years after the sodium amytal was excludable.27'
The court concluded that the scientific community had not generally
accepted the reliability of flashbacks occurring after sodium amytal
interviews.27 2 Therefore, under the Kelly test, the testimony regarding
flashbacks of events occurring when the victim was between the ages of
twelve and sixteen was also excludable. 27 Accordingly, the court directed
the trial court to issue an order granting the motion for summary judgment
in fabor of the victim's father.274 Ramona v. Superior Ct., 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d 766 (Ct. App. 1997).

2

"Id. at 769-70.
770.
"6Ramona,66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 771.
267
1d. at 773 (citing People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30 (1976)).
2681d
25
' d. at
2

269

"

1d. at 777.
270
1d.

127Ramona, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778.
272d.
2
73d.
274

1d.
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FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Serious Health Condition Required for Medical Leave
Plaintiff sued defendant for violating the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), stating she had been suffering from a serious condition.275
Based upon the evidence presented, plaintiff could not justify her absences
from work for which she did not have a physician's note. 76 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held plaintiff's condition was
not serious enough to entitle her to medical leave under the FMLA. 2 "
Hence, the court agreed with the lower court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of defendant.27
Plaintiff had been worldng for defendant employer when she missed
a day of work due to an upper respiratory tract infectionm The next day,
plaintiff went to the emergency room where she was given antibiotics 2
At the end of the week, she was examined by her physician who gave her
a written medical excuse for the week during which she had been ill.231
Her physician instructed her to return to work the following week.2'
Plaintiff gave the written excuse to her supervisor, but she failed to return
to work the following week. 2 3 After missing three consecutive days of
work, she was fired by defendant. 2" The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision, holding plaintiff employee did not suffer from a
serious health condition.285 Murrayv. Red Kap Industries, 124 F.3d 695
(5th Cir. 1997).

... Murray
27

6Id

27

v. Red Kap Industries, 124 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1997).

Id

278Murray, 124 F.3d

at 699.

279gd

28Id.
"SIL

22

1Id

2"Murray, 124
2
uid"

F.3d at 696.

'Murray v. Red Kap Industries, 124 F.3d 695, 696 (5th Cir. 1997).
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Supervisors and Employers Both Subject to Liability
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) were applicable to
supervisors as well as employers.28 6 The court found agency language in
other federal legislation mandating that only employers can incur liability
was absent from the plain language of the statute; and thus, supervisors
could be found individually liable under the FMLA.287
In June 1996, an employee had surgery and, as a result, was absent
from work for nearly three weeks.288 When the employee returned 2to
89
work, he discovered his absence had been documented as vacation time.
In October 1996, employee again became ill, and his physician informed
him his condition required surgery.2 90 Because the employee received a
telephone call from defendant supervisor informing him he would be fired
if he did not return to work, the employee returned to work five days just
after the surgery.29' The employee subsequently became ill, and his
physician ordered him to stay home from work. 292 The employee
explained the situation to the defendant supervisor, who told him not to
return to work until his physician released him.293 When the employee's
physician later released him to work, defendant supervisor told the
employee that he was terminated due to his failure to explain his
whereabouts a few days earlier.2 94 The employee then filed a complaint,
alleging violation of
the FMLA, and the defendant supervisor filed a
295
dismiss.
motion to
The issue before the court was whether supervisors could be held
liable under the FMLA.296 Although supervisors could not be held
individually liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act or Title VII,
26

1997). 287
28 8

289

2

291

Beyer v. Elkay Mfg. Co., No. 97C50067, 1997 WL 587487, at *3 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 19,

Id. at *4.
Id.

Id. at * 1.

Id.

'Beyer, No. 97C50067, 1997 WL 587487 at *1.
29
1d. (citing Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2614) (1997).
2 3Id.
24Id.
29
-1d. at
296

*1-2.

Beyer, No. 97C50067, 1997 WL 587487 at *2.
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the court held the same rationale was not necessarily applicable to the
FMLA.29 7 The court reasoned agency language in the statute specifically
precluded supervisor liability under those discrimination statutes.
Additionally, the only available remedies under those other statutes were
back pay and equitable relief, which were solely within the employer's
control. 298 The court noted the FMLA allowed for compensatory and
punitive damages; remedies that could be given by individuals.2 ' 9 Thus,
the court held if employee could show the defendant supervisors had some
control over employee's ability to take protective leave, the defendant
supervisor could be liable under the FMLA.3 0 Accordingly, the court
denied defendant supervisor's motion to dismiss. Beqer v. Elkay .Af. Co.,
No. 97 C50067, 1997 WVL 58748Z
FOOD AND DRUG
FDA Regulations Not Violated By Permissible Off-Label
Use of Screw Devices During Surgery
The Court of Appeals ofMinnesota aTrmed a lower court's judgment that
the implantation of screw devices during surgeries was a permissible offlabel use in accordance with FDA regulations.30 ' Furthermore, the court
held Minnesota's informed consent statute was inapplicable;
consequently, the physician did not have a duty to inform plaintiff patient
that the screw devices were investigational. 2
Plaintiff patient filed a claim against defendant hospital alleging
negligence, negligence per se, corporate negligence, fraudulent
concealment, and strict liability after undergoing spinal surgery in which
a physician implanted screw devices without informing plaintiff the
surgery was experimental, or the screws were investigational." -' The

'-7Id. at *3.
29Id.

'"Id
3°WId. at *4.

3'Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
102Id. at 544.
"'Id.at 537.
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lower court granted summary judgment for defendant hospital.3°4 Plaintiff
patient appealed.30 5
The court analyzed three separate issues:
1) whether the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claim;
2) whether defendant should be granted summary judgment in regards to
the negligence, negligenceper se, and fraudulent concealment claims;
and
3) whether aprimafaciecase of strict liability existed.30 6
The court first had to determine whether the claim was barred by the
proper statute of limitations.0 7 Because the claim concerned negligent
administration rather than medical malpractice, the court concluded that
a six-year statute of limitations applied. Thus, plaintiffs claim was not
time barred. 08
In determining whether defendant's actions were negligent, the court
looked at whether federal law limited implantation of the screw device in
spinal surgeries to investigational usage, or permitted the device to be
implanted as an "off-label" use.3 ° The court concluded plaintiff failed to
prove the FDA approved the use of the screw devices for arms and legs,
and prohibited use in spines.31 The court's conclusion was supported by
FDA documents declaring the implantation of the screw devices as an
"off-label" use and indicating spinal use as one of the permitted "offlabel" uses. 31 1 Furthermore, the court rejected plaintiffs claim of
violation of Minnesota's bill of rights' provisions requiring hospitals to
obtain informed consent of patients receiving investigational devices. 1
The court premised its decision on the theory that the bill of rights applied
only to those patients participating in experimental research.313
The court agreed with the lower court that plaintiff failed to establish
a primafacie case of corporate negligence for defendant's failure to
304Id.
3
os'd.
°6Femrite,568
30

N.W.2d at 538.

1d.

3

'91d. at 538-39.
Od. at 540.
3
"Femrite, 568 N.W.2d at 540.
312
31

313

1d. at 542.
1d.
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perform non-delegable duties.314 This conclusion also relied upon the
theory that the duty to obtain informed consent was limited to
investigational studies.31 s The court emphasized that even if plaintiff had
established primafacie case of strict liability, the Minnesota courts have
never recognized strict liability in the context of administrative services.
Thus, this claim could not have been recognized despite the evidence
presented.31 6 Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., 568 N. WW.2d 535,
538 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).

IMMAUNITY
Birth Defects Claims of Children of Gulf War
Veterans Dismissed Under Feres Doctrine
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed
plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the Feres doctrine and the
discretionary function exception.317
The wives and minor children of servicemen involved in the Persian
Gulf War brought three consolidated cases. 318 Plaintiffs alleged the minor
children were afflicted with severe birth defects due to their fathers'
exposure to drugs, pesticides, and other toxic and dangerous materials
used by the United States during the war.319 Plaintiffs sought damages
under the FTCA32 °and the Military Claims Act (MCA),tlaiming the
United States negligently exposed the mothers
and minor children to the
3
hazardous substances without warning. n
Based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the United States filed
a motion to dismiss.' 3 The United States also claimed plaintiff's FTCA

3141d. at 543.
"311d.(citing 21 C.F.R. § 812.100 (1996)).
6

MFermite, 568 N.W.2d at 538.

317Mirnns v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 500, 508 (D. Md. 1997).
8
31
1d.at 502.

319Id.
"228U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-80 (1997).
'l0 U.S.C. § 2731-38 (1997).

3'Minns, v. United States, 974 F. Supp. 500, 508 (D. Md. 1997)..

m31d.
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claims were barred by the decision in Feres v. United States, 324 and by
exceptions to the FTCA for discretionary functions, activities in a foreign
country, and combat activities.325 In respect to the MCA claims, the
United States argued benefit award decisions under the MCA were not
subject to judicial review.326

The court explained three purposes underlying the immunity
established by the Feres doctrine. 327 First, a "distinctively federal"
relationship must exist between superiors and soldiers.328 Second, the
existence of statutory disability and death benefits available to servicemembers preclude the need for litigation or proof of fault of the
military.329 Third, the courts should avoid second guessing the judiciary
and should preserve military discipline. 330 Finding the Feres doctrine
precluded not only suits brought by servicemen themselves for injuries
they suffered, but also injuries claimed by third parties, the court held the
plaintiffs' claims were barred by the Feres doctrine. 33'
Additionally, the MCA provided that the secretaries of the military
departments "may" settle claims against the United States.332 These
claims may involve death or personal injury caused by officers or
employees of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, who were acting within the
scope of their employment, or acting incident to the non-combat activities
of their department. 333 Settlements under the MCA are considered
conclusive and final.334 Plaintiffs, however, claimed the court could
335
review whether a civilian's injuries were in fact incident to service.
Finding that absent a constitutional violation, the MCA claims were not
336
subject to review, the court granted the United States motion to dismiss.
Minns v. UnitedStates, Nos. CIV Y-96-2504, CIV Y-96-2505, CIV 7-952506, 1997 WL 459830 (D.Md. Aug. 8, 1997).
324

Id. (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1940).

3251d.
326
1d.
327
Minns, 974 F. Supp. 502.
32
81d.
3291d.
3 31

/d.

at 504.

32 Minns, 974 F. Supp. at 507.
333

id.

3341d.
33

SId"
1d. at

336

508.

1997]

CASE BRIEFS

217

INSURANCE
Physician's Criminal Conduct Was Properly
Excluded from Coverage
The Supreme Court of New Jersey determined claims based upon injuries
caused by a physician's criminal conduct were properly denied coverage
when an insurance policy specifically excluded injuries resulting from
physician's performance of criminal acts.337 Accordingly, the court
concluded plaintiff insurer was not liable to defendant patient for damages
patient suffered as a result of defendant physician's sexual assault.33
Defendant patient was sexually assaulted during a gynecological
examination performed by defendant physician. 39 In a civil action,
defendant patient sought compensatory and punitive damages against
defendant physician for medical malpractice, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, sexual assault, assault, and battery!" The
court acknowledged defendant physician had departed from accepted
standards, and defendant patient had established a case of medical
malpractice.341 Consequently, the court awarded S50,000 in compensatory
damages as well as $50,000 in punitive damages to the defendant
patient.3 42 Defendant physician had a medical malpractice insurance
policy through plaintiff insurer.343 Prior to the final disposition of the
case, plaintiff insurer instituted this declaratory judgment action against
both defendants, seeking a determination that plaintiff insurer had no duty
to either defend the defendant physician in defendant patient's civil action
or to satisfy any portion of that judgment.3"
The specific issue presented to the appellate court was whether an
exclusion from coverage in a medical malpractice insurance policy for an
injury resulting from defendant physician's performance of a criminal act
insulated plaintiff insurer from liability. 4 The court recognized that
...Princeton Ins. Co. v. Prasert Chunmuang, 698 A.2d 9, 19-20 (NJ. 1997).
3"3.d.

3111d at 10.
MId. at 11.
34
'Princeton 698 A.2d at 11.
3

"Id.
345d. at 11.
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exclusions, such as those articulated in plaintiff insurer's policy, were
valid and did not offend public policy.34 6 The court also noted civil
liability caused by a physician's criminal conduct, such as sexual assault,
was significantly distinguishable from the liability typically contemplated
when a physician purchases medical insurance.347 Therefore, the court
held exclusion for liability based upon criminal acts was not inconsistent
with the basic purpose of malpractice insurance, or to the parties'
intentions and expectations of the insurance policy; and, thus, public
policy was not violated.348 Princeton Ins. Co. v. PrasertChunmuang,
MD., 698 A.2d 9 (N.J.1997).

Medical Plan's Subrogation Clause Granted Plan First
Priority to Plaintiff's Settlement with Third Party Insurer
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a trial
court's decision that the subrogation clause of defendants' medical plan
granted the defendants first priority to settlement. 349 However,
the court
350
fees.
attorneys'
reasonable
determine
to
remanded the case
Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident and received
medical benefits from defendant's medical plan, governed by the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).35 ' The plan paid
$157,000 for plaintiffs' medical expenses incurred by the accident, and
then sought to recover costs from plaintiffs' settlement with a third-party
insurer.352 The court held the subrogation clause under the medical plan
granted the plan first priority to a claim from the settlement.35 3 Therefore,
the medical plan was entitled to recover costs of medical expenses from
the settlement, but a dispute arose as to whether legal fees were
recoverable. a54

3

Id. at 19.

347

Princeton,698 A.2d at 11.

348

1d.

4

Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 139 (8" Cir. 1997).

1

3101d. at 141.
S'Id. at 139.
352

1d.

3S3i1d
MSWaller,

120 F.3d, at 139.
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The district court reduced the medical plan's claim by S50,000 as
reimbursement for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.355 Although the appellate
court agreed with the district court in awarding plaintiffs reasonable
attorneys' fees, the appellate court disagreed with the amount awarded
and, therefore, remanded the legal fee issue for further consideration. s6
Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138 (8th Cir. 1997).
Full-Time Status Rather than Hours Worked Determines
linimum Vork Status for Coverage
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff employee, who claimed he was
entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses along with reasonable
attorneys' fees.357 The court interpreted a minimum work requirement as
requiring an employee to have full-time employment
status, rather than a
3
particular number of hours "actively" worked. 11
Plaintiff employee was hired by defendant employer as a full-time
maintenance employee and was enrolled in defendant's group health
insurance plan regulated under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act.359 The plan required plaintiff to a minimum number of hours per
week. 36' Plaintiffs coverage was supposed to begin on May 1, 1994, and
defendant accordingly began to deduct insurance premiums.36' During his
employment, plaintiff worked less than ten hours per week and was
subsequently terminated on May 31, 1994.362 Plaintiff's entire medical
coverage had also been retroactively canceled, and he was reimbursed for
the previous premium deductions.363 On May 5, 1994, plaintiffs wife
gave birth to a premature infant and, thereafter, incurred medical

3551d.
6
/Id.at 140-41.
3'Reese
v. Brookdale Motors, 567 N.NV.2d 83, 88 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
35SId
319Id. at 85.
360d.
"'Reese,567 N.W.2d, at 85.
36Id
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expenses.364 Defendant refused to cover
those expenses under its health
3 65
suit.
filed
plaintiff
and
plan
insurance
Three issues were presented for determination by the court:
1) whether the district court erred in applying de novo standard review,
2) whether the district court erred in equating the eligibility provision
with the status of the employee, and
3) whether the district court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to
plaintiff.36
First, defendant argued the court should have reviewed plaintiffs
claim under a deferential and capricious standard of review, rather than the
de novo standard applied by the district court.367 In review of this issue,
the court was guided by precedent stating the deferential and capricious
standard of review was applicable "only when the entity denying coverage
3 68
was given deferential authority by the express language of the plan."
The court held, because defendant had not raised the standard of review
369
issue at trial, defendant could not raise the issue on appeal.
Furthermore, if defendant had raised the issue, the court would have
affirmed the district court's analysis under de novo review; because
defendant had not been granted any discretionary authority by the
insurance plan.37°
Second, the court relied upon case law in affirming the district
court's interpretation of the eligibility provision as referring to plaintiffs
status, rather than the actual number of hours worked.37 ' The court
reasoned that an alternate interpretation would forbid all forms of
absenteeism, including time off for vacation or illness. 3 7 Finally, because
the plan was regulated by ERISA, the court was governed by federal law
in which a presumption favored the beneficiary of insurance claims
through an award of attorneys' fees if the beneficiary prevailed. 373 The
364Id
3

6SId"
366Id. at 86.
317Reese, 567 N.W.2d, at 85.
3

'id. (citing and quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989),

3691d.

3701d.
M'id. at 89.

3nReese, 567 N.W.2d, at 89.

373Id
"
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court concluded defendant did not present any special circumstances to
overcome that presumption; thus, the district court was correct in granting
plaintiff attorneys' fees.374 The court also awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees
to cover the costs of the appeal.375 Reese v. Brookdale Motors, 567
N.W.2d 83 (Minn. Ct.App. 1997).

Policy's Exception Endorsement Limiting Coverage
Not Subject to Statutory Pre-Existing Conditions
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's
ruling that an exception endorsement limiting coverage for plaintiff
patient's spinal disorder was not subject to statutory pre-existing condition
restrictions on limiting coverage.376
Plaintiff patient filed an action against defendant insurance company
seeking health care benefits for her back surgery.3" This claim arose after
37
defendant hospital denied coverage pursuant to exclusion endorsement. a
Plaintiff contended coverage should be imposed because the back
condition was not a pre-existing condition.379 In the alternative, plaintiff
argued if court found a pre-existing condition, state law prohibited the

denial of coverage on this basis.S Cross-motions for summaryjudgment
were filed.381 The lower court granted defendant insurance company's
motion for surnmaryjudgment on the premise that endorsement and preexisting condition limitations were separate, unrelated provisions, and
plaintiff appealed. 3
The court held the pre-existing condition limitation operated
separately and independently from the exception endorsement of
plaintiff's policy. 33 The court noted the state statute restricted an
insurance company from denying coverage for a pre-existing condition
74

3

Id

"'SId "
"Wynn v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 1997).
'id. at 268.
3 8id.
379Id.
31Wynn,

122 F.3d at 268.

2

391d
"1Id.at 269.
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that incurred more than twelve months after coverage began. 38 The court
reasoned this provision was intended to be enforced when an insurance
policy did not provide for pre-existing conditions.3 5 However, when an
endorsement policy did exist, exclusion of coverage was justified because
insurance companies were free to limit their liability.38 6 Thus, the court
held the exception endorsement did not operate to deny coverage for a preexisting condition, but rather excluded coverage for any injury, disease,
or disorder of the spine. 387 This exclusion was proper. 388 Wynn v.
Washington Nat ' Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 266 (Cir.51997).

Payment of First Party Medical Expenses
Not Subject to Subrogation
The Supreme Court of Kansas held an insured's Missouri insurance policy
applied to an accident that occurred in Kansas, and his payment of firstparty medical expenses was not subject to subrogation. 389 The court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the insured had received
money for medical expenses from the other accident victim.390
The insured was a Missouri resident involved in an automobile
accident in Kansas. 39 1 After his insurance company paid his medical
392
expenses, the insured commenced a tort action against the other driver.
A legal assistant of the firm representing the insured told the insurance
company that the firm would protect its personal injury protection lien in
the event the insured recovered from the other driver.393 The insured
subsequently settled with the other driver, although the insurance
company was not reimbursed for any medical expenses it had paid on
behalf of the insured.39 4 The insurance company then filed suit against the

'"Id. (citing

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:215.12).

3

..Id. at 269.

386 Wynn, 122 F.3d at 269.

3811d "
8

1d.

3
.
39

afeco Ins. Co. Of Am. v. Allen, 941 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Kan. 1997).
0id.
391id. at 1366.
2
"3
d. at 1367.
393Id.

'9Safeco, 941 P.2d at 1371.
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insured, as well as the attorney and the legal assistant who represented the
insured.395
The first issue addressed by the court on appeal was whether the
insurance company had a right to recover the first $2,000 of medical
expenses paid on behalf of the insured. 39 6 The court followed the general
rule providing the law of the state where the insurance contract was made
governs, unless the law contravened Kansas' public policy 9 7 Because the
court concluded the medical payment provision of the Missouri insurance
policy was not violative of Kansas' public policy, Missouri law was
controlling. 398 The court further held the first $2,000 paid by the insurance
company for the insured's expenses was not subject to subrogation in
accordance with the contract between the insured and the insurance
company.39 The court reasoned the first $2,000 payment of medical
expenses was paid under the first-party medical benefits, not under Kansas
personal injury protection benefits. Thus, that amount was not subject to
subrogation.
The court also affirmed the district court's ruling in
dismissing the insurance company's claims against the insured and the
legal assistant for lack of personal jurisdiction, because neither of them
had committed a tortious act in the state of Kansas. 40 ' Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Allen, 941 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Kan. 1997).
MANAGED CARE
HMOs May Encourage Physicians to Minimize Costs and
are not Obligated to Disclose Physician Compensation
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted in part and denied in part a health maintenance organization's
(HMO) motion for summary judgment in a class action suit brought under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 92- Plaintiff's

3

9sId.

"61d. at 1367.
'Id. at 1373.
398Id
3"Safeco, 941 P.2d at 1368.

4wId.
01"Id. at 1367, 1372.
\eiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, 972 F. Supp. 748,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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complaint alleged express and implied breaches of contract, as well as
various breaches of fiduciary duties.40 3
Plaintiff was a participant in a health care plan provided by her
employer.40 4 Under the plan, employees were treated by physicians
participating in an HMO.40 5 Plaintiff first alleged the HMO breached its

fiduciary obligation and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
by preventing its physicians, via gag orders, from advising patients of
treatment options that were not compensable by the HMO. 0 6 The court
held the claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith was preempted
by the terms of ERISA.4 07 However, the court
found plaintiff had stated
408
a valid claim with regard to the "gag order.
Second, plaintiff claimed by pressuring physicians to under-treat
patients to maximize profits, the HMO breached its fiduciary duty toward
the plan participants as well as its implied covenant of good faith. 4 9 The
court dismissed this claim, holding such claims were preempted by
ERISA.41 ° Plaintiff also alleged defendant failed to comply with
disclosure requirements set forth by ERISA by not disclosing the nature
of its physicians' compensation contracts.4 1 The court dismissed this
claim, reasoning the obligation to disclose was placed upon the
administrator of the plan, not the HMO. 4 2 Further, the court held the
scope of the disclosure provisions did not reach information concerning
physician compensation.4 3 Weiss v. CIGNA Health Care,972 F. Supp.
748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

4031d.
4
05Id
4

at 751.
Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 750.
4081d.
061d.

407

4

0Id. at 750-753.

"1Od.

1
1d. at 753-754.
412
4

4 13

Weiss, 972 F. Supp. at 753-54.
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ERISA Precludes State Law Against H IO
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
determined plaintiff's HMO plan was governed under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); thus, his claim could not be
brought under state law. a1 The court held plaintiff's claim failed under
ERISA, because he did not have an actual plan or an administrator! 5
Plaintiff was required to obtain pre-authorization for medical
treatment under his HMO. 6 After plaintiff injured his leg in an
automobile accident, he required surgery to correct injuries to his heel
bone.417 Plaintiff, however, did not undergo the surgical procedure,
because he could not obtain pre-authorization from defendant insurer. 4 3
Consequently, plaintiff's condition was no longer correctable; and
therefore, plaintiff and his wife filed a complaint alleging breach of
contract, negligent performance of contract, and loss of consortium!"
Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, because a state law
claim could not be asserted due to ERISA pre-emption.20
The issue presented to the court was whether plaintiff's claims were
governed by state law or ERISA. 421 The court held plaintiff's claim
relating to breach of contract could not stand, because the claim was
4
related to the employee benefit plan that was pre-empted by ERISA 2
Because ERISA required plaintiff to identify a plan administrator, the
court dismissed all claims against defendant because defendant was not
named plan administrator in plaintiffs complaint.4
Furthermore,
plaintiffs could not recover money damages from defendant; under
ERISA, suits to recover damages could only be brought against the terms
of a plan 24 Because defendant was not a plan, plaintiff could not recover
4
41 Smith v.

Prudential Health Care Plan, No. Civ. A. 97-891, 1997 WL 5S7340, at *5 (E.D.
Pa., Sept.
41 10, 1997.
1d. at *3.
416
1d. at *1.
417Id.
8
41
1d.
4 19

Smith 1997 WL 587340, at* *.
2Id. at *2.

4

421
4 1d.
22Id.
42

at *3.
44Smith, 1997
1
WL 587340, at *3.
-1i

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol.2:183

money damages. The court refused to dismiss the entire complaint,
however, because plaintiff sought equitable remedies in addition to
monetary damages.425
Defendant further argued plaintiff's claims must fail, because not all
of the available administrative remedies had been exhausted, as required
by ERISA.426 The court rejected this argument, holding plaintiff had
invoked the denial of meaningful access exception to the exhaustion
requirement.427 The court declined to dismiss plaintiffs ERISA claims,
because the defendant refused to provide plaintiff with a procedure to
determine the validity of the medical service requests.428 Smith v.
PrudentialHealth CarePlan,No. Civ. A. 97-891, 1997 WL 587340, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1997).
MARIJUANA REGULATION
Scheduling Marijuana as Schedule I
Drug Not Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court of Washington overturned a lower court's grant of
plaintiff patient's motion for summary judgment in his action against the
state for categorizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug.429
During his battle with cancer, plaintiff received radiation therapy and
chemotherapy.430 To relieve nausea and vomiting commonly associated
with that treatment, plaintiff took a synthetic form of marijuana,
tetrahydrocannabinal (THC). 43 ' Plaintiff also smoked marijuana to relieve
the side effects of chemotherapy and preferred that method.432 However,
marijuana was federally and state regulated as a Schedule I drug and thus,
illegal for all purposes except research.433
Plaintiff asked the court for a declaratory judgment ordering
placement of marijuana as a Schedule I drugs as violative of the state
42Id.
46

11d. at *4.

427

4

Id

nId.

4

2'Seeley v. State, 940 P. 2d 604 (Wash. 1997).
430Id. at 607.
431d.
4321d.
4331d.
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constitution. 43' Plaintiff also asked the court to order the board of
pharmacy to reclassify marijuana, which would permit physicians to
prescribe the drug for therapeutic purposes!" The lower court granted the
motion for summary judgment, finding the placement of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug
violative of plaintiff's rights and liberties under the state
3
constitution.

1

The court overturned the lower court's grant of summary judgment,
first rejecting plaintiff's argument that the case should be decided based
upon the state constitution, which would afford greater rights and
The court noted substantial
privileges than the federal constitution.
similarities between the federal controlled substances law and Washington
State's Uniform Controlled Substances Act, showing the legislature
intended to be part of"a uniform policy to control illegal drugs. ' A38 Due
to this intended uniformity, the court concluded an independent
assessment of the rights afforded under the state constitution was not
warranted. 439 Instead, the "federal and state protections [were]
coextensive in this context" and thus, federal protections would always be
utilized to resolve issues regarding the scheduling of drugs." 0
Plaintiff next asserted the scheduling of marijuana as a Schedule I
drug implicated a fundamental right, and therefore, any legislative
decision should be subjected to strict scrutiny."' Plaintiff argued the drug
classification must further a compelling state interest in order to withstand
that level of scrutiny."' The court rejected plaintiff's argument, holding
individuals did not have a constitutionally protected interest in having
physicians prescribe marijuana." Applying the rational basis standard,
the court determined the legislature had a legitimate reason to classify
marijuana as a Schedule I substance based upon its scientific data and the
availability of THC as a substitute treatment." Accordingly, the court
43

'Seeley, 940 P.2d at 608.

43

SId"
436
1d.
437
1d.
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S1d.
Seeley, 940 P.2d at 608
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denied plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. 44 Seeley v. State, 940 P.
2d 604 (Wash. 1997).
NEGLIGENCE
Physicians Are Not Presumed to Possess Reasonable
Skill in Treating Patients
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district
court's dismissal of a negligence claim against a physician charged with
medical malpractice arising from the implantation of an intrauterine
device (IUD). 446
Despite defendant physician's insertion of an IUD in plaintiff patient,
plaintiffbecame pregnant three months later. 47 After several unsuccessful
attempts by defendant to remove the IUD, plaintiff delivered a premature
baby."48 The baby was born with serious medical problems, and plaintiff
sued defendant for medical malpractice. 449 Upon a jury determination that
defendant had met4 acceptable standards of medical care, the trial judge
dismissed the suit. 10
The issue presented for review was whether the trial court erred in
instructing the jury that physicians were presumed to possess the requisite
knowledge and skill when treating patients. 451 Holding the trial court's
jury instruction was reversible error, the court reviewed the case de novo
and made several findings. 452 First, reasoning that defendant had the
responsibility of preserving plaintiffs medical records, the court held
defendant's failure to produce plaintiffs records warranted a presumption
that the records were unfavorable to defendant.45 a Second, the court found
defendant did not adequately inform plaintiff of the risks involved with
continuing a pregnancy with an implanted IUD. 454 The court relied upon
'ISd. at 623.

'Williams v. Godlen, 699 So. 2d 102 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
4481d.
449d.

4501d.
451Williams, 699 So. 2d at 106.
4S21d. at 106.
43
1 1d. at 106-7.
4
41d. at 112.
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expert testimony that established that physicians must inform patients of
the risks of RIDs, such as spontaneous abortion or premature delivery.' 456
Third, the court found defendant committed medical malpractice. 1
In reviewing the evidence, the court held defendant should have ordered
additional tests and hospitalized plaintiff.45 7 Finally, the court held
plaintiffs child was entitled to $500,000 in damages for pain and
suffering, and plaintiff was entitled to $100,000 for general damages as
well as $65,853.18 for past and future medical expenses.4" Williams v.
Godlen, MD, 699 So. 2d 102 (La. Ct. App. 1997).

VACCINE DEVELOPMENT
Compensation Granted Under National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act for Measles/Rubella Vaccine
The United States Court of Federal Claims determined petitioners were
entitled to compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986 (Act).4 9 The court held petitioners had satisfied the elements for
a primafacie case by establishing the measles/rubella (MIR) vaccine
significantly aggravated their daughters' underlying tuberous sclerosis
disorder. 4 °
Petitioners alleged their daughter suffered significant aggravation of
her tuberous sclerosis disorder due to a grand mal seizure which occurred
ten days after she received an M/R vaccination. 4 61 Petitioners claimed the
seizure resulted from a high fever she developed as a reaction to the
vaccine. 42 Petitioners further claimed their daughter was prone to future
seizures due to her underlying condition of tuberous sclerosis 4- and their

45

SId

461d
4

at 1I3.

4 'Willians, 699 So. 2d at 113.

SSId. at 110.
S"Evans v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-3142V, 1997 WL
429719, at *14 (Fed. Cl. July 15, 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-I et seq. (West 1991)).
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daughter never had a seizure prior to receiving the M/R vaccination. 6
Subsequent to the vaccination, however, petitioner's daughter began
suffering two to four seizures per week. 65
Respondent, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, claimed petitioner's daughter had contracted an intercurrent viral
4 66
infection, and had not suffered an adverse reaction to the M/R vaccine.
Respondent's expert in pediatrics and epidemiology of infectious diseases
testified petitioner's daughter's high fever stemming from the viral
4 67
infection was the cause of the seizure, not a reaction to the M/R vaccine.
After hearing from numerous experts on M/R vaccine and tuberous
sclerosis, the court found petitioner's daughter had indeed suffered a
reaction to the M/R vaccine. 468 The court specifically noted the daughter
was not diagnosed with a viral infection while she was in the hospital. 69
Furthermore, the court based its decision on the fact she was suffering
from symptoms indicative of a measles reaction, including a rash and
fever.470 Based on these findings, the court held petitioners were entitled
to compensation under the Act, and encouraged the parties to settle the
damages portion of the claim. 471 Evans v. Secretaryof the Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., No. 90-3142V, 1997 WL 429719 (Fed. Ct. July 15,
1997).
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46Id. at *13.
467Id.

4681d.
MSId.
.. 90Evans, No. 90-3142V, 1997 WL 429719, at * 11.
47d
7'Id. at *13.

